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Abstract
We analyse a multistage game of competition among auctioneers. First, the
auctioneers commit to some reserve prices; second, the bidders enter one auction, if
any; and finally, the auctions take place. We show that for any finite set of feasible
reserve prices, each auctioneer announces a reserve price equal to his production
cost if the numbers of auctioneers and bidders are sufficiently large, though finite.
Our result supports the idea that optimal auctions may be quite simple. Our
model also confirms previous results for some “limit” versions of the model by
McAfee [3], Peters [4], and Peters and Severinov [8].
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, D82. Key
words: auctions, competition, large markets.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study a multistage game of competition among auctioneers. In
the first stage auctioneers compete for a common pool of bidders by means of credible
announcements of the minimum price accepted in a second price auction. In the second
stage each bidder chooses an auction, if any, in which to participate. Finally, in the last
stage each of the announced auctions takes place. This time structure was originally
suggested by McAfee [3] in his pioneering work on competition among auctioneers.
We show that for any finite auctioneers’ strategy space, if the number of auction-
eers1 is sufficiently large, and the set of production costs lies in the set of reserve
prices, auctioneers announce a reserve price equal to their respective production costs
in the unique symmetric equilibrium. Thus, our result supports the idea that optimal
auctions may be easy to implement even when the seller has uncertainty about the
market. In this case, we show that the optimal reserve price in a second price auction
does not need to be fine-tuned to the auctioneer’s beliefs about the market. Indeed,
the optimal reserve price is quite simple, it equals the production cost.
Related results have been proven in previous papers under the assumption that
that the number of agents is infinite and with a continuous strategy space, for example
by McAfee2 [3], Peters [4], and Peters and Severinov [8]. The intuition that underlines
these papers is that bidders’ expected utility is always determined by the market, and
hence, invariant to changes in one single auction if there is an infinite number of agents.
Given that the bidders’ expected utility is taken as given by the auctioneer, his best
strategy is to announce a mechanism that creates the maximum surplus. For instance,
if the auctioneer only chooses the reserve price of a second price auction, this means
to fix the reserve price equal to the production cost.
However, the simplicity of this optimal rule seems to hinge on the assumption that
the number of auctioneers is infinite. Even if the number of agents is large, changes in
one single auction have an effect, albeit small, on the bidders’ expected utility. Thus,
auctioneers could profit by reducing the bidders’ expected utility with a deviation
from the mechanism that maximises the surplus. In fact, for the case in which all the
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auctioneers have the same production cost, we could show that the strategy reserve
price equal to production cost is not an equilibrium when the number of auctioneers is
finite. Actually, it is not even clear that the equilibrium of the finite game is close in
any sense to the equilibrium of the limit game.
In general, we would expect that the auctioneers’ equilibrium behaviour is more
complex. For instance, each auctioneer in equilibrium may need to adjust his reserve
price to his beliefs about the demand and supply primitives and possibly to his beliefs
about the behaviour of the other auctioneers.
Our work shows that the intuition suggested in the last two paragraphs is somewhat
misleading. The reason for the break down of the result when the number of auctioneers
is finite is that by assuming that the strategy space is continuous we allow arbitrary
small deviations. If we assume more realistically that the number of strategies is finite,
then deviations from the surplus maximising strategy have losses bounded away from
zero. Moreover, gains due to decreases in bidders’ expected utility tend to zero as
the number of auctioneers tends to infinity. Hence, the limit result price equal to
production cost will also be an equilibrium for a large enough number of auctioneers.
Our work fills the gap in the literature that exists between the limit models with an
infinite number of auctioneers and the models with only two auctioneers. The papers
we mention above, [3, 4, 8], belong to the former group and an example of the latter is
the paper by Burguet and Sa´kovics [2]. We also prove that there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium, whereas the above papers only provide existence results. One exception
is the paper by Peters and Severinov [8]. They prove uniqueness of equilibria for the
case in which all the auctioneers have the same production cost. Our uniqueness result
differs in that we look at the case in which auctioneers may have different production
costs.
The problem of competition among auctioneers under limit assumptions about the
number of auctioneers has also been studied by Peters [5, 7] in other frameworks. For
instance, the first paper deals with the private value model under the assumption of
correlated types, and the second with the common value model. We restrict to the
private value model with independent types.
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Our model also relates to the model of price competition by Peters [6]. He studies
the convergence of the exact equilibrium with a finite number of sellers to the equilib-
rium defined under different infinite number of sellers’ assumptions. Our model differs
in two aspects. First, we study a model of competition in auctions, not in prices. Sec-
ond, we do not look to equilibria of limit games or approximate equilibria, but rather
consider exact equilibria of large finite games.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start with a description of the model
in Section 2. Section 3 includes the main result of the paper. Section 4 concludes. We
also include an Appendix with most of the proofs.
2 The Model
We assume that there are J ∈ N auctioneers and kJ ∈ N bidders. We shall later
consider the limit J → ∞. When doing this, we shall keep the ratio k > 0 of bidders
to auctioneers fixed.
Each auctioneer has the ability to produce a single indivisible unit of output at a
private cost w. We allow w to differ across the auctioneers, although we assume that
each auctioneer’s private cost is common knowledge. This last assumption is done to
keep coherency with the literature (e.g. Peters [6]). The model could be extended with
similar results to the case in which the production cost is private information.
We also take a given distribution H with support ΠW and assume that for each
J the number of auctioneers with production cost less or equal than w equals the
maximum integer j for which j/J ≤ H(w). Note that as J tends to infinity, the
distribution of production costs converges point-wise, and thus weakly, to H.
Each bidder wishes to purchase exactly one unit of the commodity. Its value for
each bidder, x, is privately observed before the beginning of the game. All other players
only know that these values are independently drawn from the set [0, 1] according to
the same distribution function F with a density f and support3 [0, 1].
If an auctioneer with production cost w trades with a bidder with type x at a price
p, they are assumed to obtain a von Neumann Morgenstern utility of p−w and of x−p
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respectively. In the case that there is no trade, both the auctioneer and the bidder
get a von Neumann Morgenstern utility of 0. Notice that this assumption implies that
the production occurs, and production costs are incurred, only once a trade has been
agreed. The production cost could also be seen as an opportunity cost.
We consider a three stage game. In the first stage auctioneers simultaneously
announce their reserve prices. In the second stage, the entry game, each bidder upon
observing the auctioneers’ announcements can either pick one and only one auction4
in which she wants to participate, or she can choose to participate in no auction. In
the final stage those bidders who have chosen to participate in some particular auction
make their bids in their corresponding auctions. For the sake of simplicity, we shall
only consider second price auctions with no entry fee.5
We shall assume that the auctioneers choose their reserve prices from a finite6 set
Π ≡ {r1, r2, ..., rR} ⊂ [0, 1), where rj > rl if j > l. To allow for the possibility of the
strategy reserve price equal to production cost we shall assume that the support of
the production costs also lie in Π, i.e. ΠW ⊂ Π. We shall call a pure strategy for the
auctioneers a map from ΠW to Π that gives the auctioneer’s reserve price as a function
of his production cost.
We also add two assumptions more. The first one is that the minimum reserve
price equals the minimum production cost, i.e. min Π = min ΠW . The second one is
that auctioneers’ production costs are not too high in some sense. More precisely, that
the unique solution of the system of equations of Lemma 3 for G = H is such that
each reserve price in the support of H has an associated solution (we shall call it limit
cut-off) less than one. We explain the role of these two assumptions after Lemma 5.
3 The Main Result
We start with the main result of the paper and prove it in the rest of the section.
Proposition 1. There exists a threshold J¯ such that if J ≥ J¯ , there is a unique sym-
metric Nash equilibrium in which auctioneers use pure strategies. In this equilibrium,
each auctioneer announces a reserve price equal to his production cost.
6
We prove this result using backward induction. We start noting that standard
arguments show that the last stage, the bidding game, has a unique symmetric equi-
librium strategy, to bid the true value. We continue with the study of the second
stage, the entry game, assuming that bidders will bid in the third stage according to
the former strategy.
We can describe an entry game with an increasing function GJ : R→ {i ∈ N : i ≤
J}, with jump points in Π, and where GJ(x) specifies the number of auctioneers that
have announced a reserve price less or equal than x. We shall refer to the family of
such functions as GJ . One interesting feature that shall be used in our analysis is that
GJ/J is a probability distribution function with support in Π.
To describe the equilibrium of the entry game we introduce what we call cut-off
strategies. These are mixed strategies that can be characterised by a vector of cut-
offs ~y and that have the following features: (i) each reserve price rj in the support
of GJ/J has an associated cut-off yj ∈ [0, 1]; (ii) if rj ≥ rl, then yj ≥ yl; (iii) the
bidder enters an auction with reserve price rj with positive probability if and only if
her type is weakly higher than yj ; and (iv), the bidder randomises uniformly among
all the auctions which she enters with positive probability.
For notational convenience we assume in the statement and proof of the following
lemma that GJ/J has support Π.
Lemma 1. There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game. In this
equilibrium bidders use a cut-off strategy characterised by the unique vector of cut-offs
that solves the following conditions:
(i) y1 = r1.
(ii) For j 6= 1, Ψ(yj ; ~y,GJ) = rj, if yj < 1.
(iii) For j 6= 1, Ψ(yj ; ~y,GJ) ≤ rj, if yj = 1.
where for any x ∈ (yj−1, yj ],
Ψ(x; ~y,GJ) ≡
∫ x
yj−1
x˜
dz(x˜; ~y,GJ)kJ−1
z(x; ~y,GJ)kJ−1
+ rj−1
[
z(yj−1; ~y,GJ)
z(x; ~y,GJ)
]kJ−1
,
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and,
z(x; ~y,GJ) ≡ 1− F (yj)− F (x)
GJ(rj−1)
−
R∑
q=j
F (yq+1)− F (yq)
GJ(rq)
,
with yR+1 ≡ 1.
Condition (i) has an obvious interpretation. To understand the other conditions
of the lemma, note first that the function z(x; ~y,GJ) is the probability7 that a bidder
i that follows a cut-off strategy ~y either has a type below x or she does not bid in a
given auction with a reserve price rj−1.
Then, the function Ψ(x; ~y,GJ) equals the expected price that a bidder i with
type x ∈ (yj−1, yj ] pays conditional on winning in an auction with reserve price rj−1
when all the other bidders follow the same cut-off strategy defined by ~y. To see
why note the following. The probability that bidder i wins equals z(x; ~y,GJ)kJ−1.
This implies that for x˜ ∈ (yj−1, x] the probability that the price is below x˜ given
that bidder i wins equals z(x˜; ~y,GJ)kJ−1/z(x; ~y,GJ)kJ−1. It also implies that the
probability that no other bidder enters this auction conditional on bidder i winning
equals z(yj−1; ~y,GJ)kJ−1/z(x; ~y,GJ)kJ−1. In this last case bidder i pays the reserve
price rj−1.
Note also that a bidder i with type yj pays the reserve price rj if she wins when all
the other bidders follow the same cut-off strategy defined by ~y. This is because bidder
i only wins when no other bidder enters the same auction.
Consequently, conditions (ii) and (iii) compare the expected price paid by a bidder
with a type equal to an arbitrary cut-off yj conditional on winning an auction with
reserve price rj with the same conditional expected price in an auction with the reserve
price immediately lower, this is rj−1. When bidders use cut-off strategies, the proba-
bility of winning is the same in both auctions. Consequently, our conditions compare
the expected utility of entering both auctions for bidders with cut-off values. These
conditions are similar to the equilibrium conditions proposed by Peters and Severinov
[8, Theorem 6, p. 173]. The contribution of Lemma 1 is to show that these conditions
have a unique solution.
Our uniqueness proof uses the fact that conditions (i)-(ii) (condition (iii) is a bound-
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ary condition) define a map from equilibrium cut-offs to reserve prices. Then, our proof
is based on the fact that conditions (i)-(iii) satisfies some continuity and monotonic
properties that assure that this map is globally invertible. This also explains our
convergence results, see Lemmas 3 and 4, and the comments in between.
Lemma 2. The expected payoffs of an auctioneer with production cost w ∈ ΠW that
sets reserve price rj ∈ Π equal:
Φ(rj , w, G˜J−1) ≡
∫ 1
y∗j (GJ )
(Ψ(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)− w) dz(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)kJ , (1)
where G˜J−1 ∈ GJ−1 describes the other auctioneers’ reserve prices, GJ the distribution
of reserve prices induced by G˜J−1 and rj, and ~y∗(GJ) = (y∗1(GJ), y∗2(GJ), ...y∗R(GJ))
denotes the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game induced by GJ (see Lemma
1.)
Proof in the Appendix.
We shall concentrate on the analysis of the game that the auctioneers play when
the number of auctioneers is large but finite. To do so we shall follow an indirect
approach. We shall approximate the payoffs in the finite game with the limit payoffs
when the number of auctioneers tends to infinity. The advantage of this approach is
that the limit payoffs are more tractable than the finite version.
The first step to compute the limit payoffs is to compute the limit of the equilibrium
cut-offs. We start providing some conditions that we shall show are the limit of the
conditions (i)-(iii). To introduce these conditions we also use some functions that are
limit versions of the functions z and Ψ.
We shall denote by G the family of probability distribution functions that has
support in Π. Then:
Lemma 3. For any given distribution function G ∈ G, there exists a unique vector of
cut-offs ~y = (y1, y2, ..., yR) that satisfies the following conditions:
(i’) For j ≤ j(G), yj = rj.
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(ii’) For j > j(G), Ψ¯(yj ; ~y,G) = rj, if yj < 1.
(iii’) For j > j(G), Ψ¯(yj ; ~y,G) ≤ rj, if yj = 1.
where j(G) is such that rj(G) is the minimum reserve price in the support of G, and
where for any x > yj(G) and x ∈ (yj−1, yj ],
Ψ¯(x; ~y,G) ≡
∫ x
yj−1
x˜
dz¯(x˜; ~y,G)
z¯(x; ~y,G)
+ rj−1
z¯(yj−1; ~y,G)
z¯(x; ~y,G)
,
and,
z¯(x; ~y,G) ≡ e−k
[
F (yj)−F (x)
G(rj−1) +
∑R
l=j
F (yl+1)−F (yl)
G(rl)
]
,
with yR+1 ≡ 1.
Proof in the Appendix.
Once again, the uniqueness proof is implicitly based on the fact that conditions
(i’)-(ii’) (condition (iii’) is a boundary condition) have some continuity and monotonic-
ity properties that assure that these conditions define a globally invertible map from
equilibrium cut-offs to reserve prices. Global invertibility under the same properties
of continuity and monotonicity also explains that the equilibrium cut-offs converge to
the limit cut-offs when the functions in conditions (i)-(iii) converge to the functions in
conditions (i’)-(iii’). This is the core of the proof of the following lemma that states
the limit of the auctioneer’s payoffs:
Lemma 4. Consider an infinite sequence {G˜J−1}J (G˜J−1 ∈ GJ−1) such that G˜J−1/(J−
1) converges weakly8 to G ∈ G when J tends to infinity. Then, for any w ∈ ΠW and
for any rj ∈ Π,
Φ(rj , w, G˜J−1)
J→∞−−−→ Φ¯(rj , w,G),
where, Φ¯(rj , w,G) is defined for rj < rj(G),∫ 1
rj(G)
(
Ψ¯(x; ~y∗(G), G)− w) dz¯(x; ~y∗(G), G) + (rj(G) − w)z¯(rj(G); ~y∗(G), G)
and for rj ≥ rj(G), ∫ 1
y∗j (G)
(
Ψ¯(x; ~y∗(G), G)− w) dz¯(x; ~y∗(G), G),
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where ~y∗(G) denotes the unique vector of cut-offs that solves conditions (i’)-(iii’), see
Lemma 3.
Proof in the Appendix.
We next show that for the limit payoffs it is weakly dominant to set the reserve price
equal to the production cost. To state this result we denote by rj¯(G) the minimum
reserve price with an associated cut-off equal to one. Note that auctioneers with a
reserve price rj ≥ rj¯(G) obtain limit payoffs equal to zero.
Lemma 5. For any G ∈ G, w ∈ ΠW , and rj ∈ Π \ w:
(A) If rj(G) < w < rj¯(G), then Φ¯(w,w,G) > Φ¯(rj , w,G).
(B) If w ≤ rj(G), then
 Φ¯(w,w,G) > Φ¯(rj , w,G) for rj ≥ rj(G)Φ¯(w,w,G) = Φ¯(rj , w,G) otherwise.
(C) If w ≥ rj¯(G), then
 Φ¯(w,w,G) > Φ¯(rj , w,G) for rj < rj¯(G)Φ¯(w,w,G) = Φ¯(rj , w,G) otherwise.
Proof. Condition (ii) and the fact that Ψ¯(x; ~y,G) strictly increases in x imply that
rj = w weakly maximises the auctioneer’s expected profits. It is a bit tedious, but
mechanical, to check when the maximum is strict. ¥
We finish the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix. Basically, we use the fact
that the strict payoff comparisons in Lemma 5 should also hold for J sufficiently large.
These conditions are sufficient to prove that reserve price equal to production cost is
the unique equilibrium if J is large enough. However, it is important to note how
this method depends on two assumptions that we have made and that get around two
additional difficulties.
First, the limit payoff function becomes flat for reserve prices below rj(G), and
thus the limit payoffs do not provide strict comparisons for deviations below rj(G),
see Lemma 5(B). Our assumption that the auctioneers cannot announce reserve prices
below the minimum production cost avoids this problem. Note that lower reserve
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prices are difficult to believe as they mean losses ex post for any auctioneer. This
assumption was also implicity done by Peters and Severinov [8].
Second, if the auctioneers have production costs too high, it can be the case that
the policy reserve price equal to production cost has an associated limit cut-off equal
to one, i.e. there exists w ∈ ΠW such that w ≥ rj¯(G). Intuitively, this means that fixing
a reserve price equal to production cost attracts no bidder almost surely in the limit.9
Thus, the auctioneer gets zero limit payoffs. Exactly the same as with any other reserve
price above rj¯(G), see Lemma 5(C). As a consequence, auctioneers may be indifferent
between fixing a reserve price equal to production cost and another reserve price above
rj¯(G). This can cause multiplicity of equilibria. To avoid it, we have assumed that any
reserve price in the support of H has an associated limit equilibrium cut-off less than
one, when the limit distribution of reserve prices equals the distribution of production
costs, i.e. w < rj¯(H) for any w ∈ ΠW .
4 Conclusions
As we have argued in the Introduction, the analysis of the game with a continuous
strategy space suggests that the auctioneer’s optimal reserve price may depend on the
auctioneer’s beliefs about the market in a complex way. Our equilibrium analysis shows
that this is not the case when the strategy space is finite. The optimal reserve price
is quite simple and independent of the market characteristics whenever the number of
auctioneers is sufficiently large.
This difference seems to suggest that the assumption that the strategy space is
continuous may be somewhat misleading. We could reconcile the results of both models
if we showed that the equilibrium strategy in the continuous strategy space model
converge in some sense to reserve price equal to reserve price when the number of
auctioneers tends to infinity. This seems a very difficult task. The payoff functions are
so complex that a direct analysis of the finite game seems unfeasible.
The way we got around these difficulties in our model was by approximating the
auctioneer’s payoff function by its more tractable point-wise limit when the number
12
of auctioneers tends to infinity. This approach works in our model because finiteness
assures that for a sufficiently large number of auctioneers the exact payoff function can
be arbitrary close to its point-wise limit not only for a proposed strategy but also for
any possible deviation.10 This is not the case when the strategy space is continuous.
Then, the above result requires some kind of uniform convergence11 of payoffs and this
may be difficult to prove if not impossible. The reason is that uniform convergence of
payoffs preserves continuity, see [10, Theorem 7.12, p. 150], and this is a contradiction
with the fact that the auctioneers’ payoff functions are continuous in the finite game
whereas the limit payoffs are discontinuous.12
Moreover, uniform convergence with respect to the auctioneer’s type and strategy
may not be sufficient. It guarantees that in large markets the auctioneer’s best re-
sponse is close to the strategy reserve price equal to production cost when the other
auctioneers use this strategy. This implies convergence in terms of ²-equilibria but not
in terms of exact equilibria. To show the latter, we need to show that the auctioneer’s
best response is close to reserve price equal to production cost when the other auction-
eers’ strategies are close to reserve price equal to production cost. In our model, the
assumption that the strategy space is discrete avoids this problem because the only
reserve price sufficiently close to the production cost is the production cost itself.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: Proof that conditions (i)-(iii) are necessary and sufficient for an
equilibrium.
That the symmetric equilibria of the entry game are in cut-off strategies has been
proved by Peters and Severinov [8, Theorem 5, p. 172]. They [8, Theorem 6, p. 173]
also provide a system of equations on the vector of cut-offs whose solutions characterise
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the set of equilibria in cut-off strategies. These equations are basically indifference
conditions. Each equation says that when all the bidders follow a given cut-off strategy,
a bidder with value yj must be indifferent between entering an auction with reserve
price rj and entering an auction with reserve price r1.
As we have argued, our conditions state something similar: when all the bidders
follow a given cut-off strategy, a bidder with value yj must be indifferent between
entering an auction with reserve price rj and an auction with reserve price rj−1. After
some algebra, basically substituting recursively in our conditions (ii), we can easily
show that our conditions generate the same system of equations as the conditions by
Peters and Severinov.
We also include a condition (iii) for the case in which some cut-offs are one, this
is that some auctions do not attract bidders. This case was not considered by Peters
and Severinov [8]. However, it is easy to show that condition (iii) must be included
when we look for necessary and sufficient conditions for an a symmetric equilibrium in
which some cut-offs equal one.
Step 2: Proof that conditions (i)-(iii) have a unique solution.
It is easier to prove this result and the convergence results in Lemma 3 using this
new notation for conditions (i)-(iii):
• (i) y1 = r1
• (ii) ΛGJj (yj−1, yj , ..., yR) = 0 if yj < 1 (j 6= 1).
• (iii) ΛGJj (yj−1, yj , ..., yR) ≤ 0 if yj = 1 (j 6= 1).
Where ΛGJj (yj−1, yj , ..., yR) ≡
∫ +∞
−∞ x dµj−1(x|~y,GJ)− rj , (j ∈ {2, 3, ..., R}) and,
µj−1(x|~y,GJ) ≡

0 if x ∈ (−∞, rj−1)
z(yj−1;~y,GJ )kJ−1
z(yj ;~y,GJ )kJ−1
if x ∈ [rj−1, yj−1)
z(x;~y,GJ )
kJ−1
z(yj ;~y,GJ )kJ−1
if x ∈ [yj−1, yj)
1 if x ∈ [yj ,∞).
(2)
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Lemma 6. The function ΛGJj (yj−1, yj , ..., yR) (j ∈ {2, 3, ..., R}) is continuous, weakly
decreasing in yj−1, strictly increasing in yj and weakly increasing in yj+1, yj+2, ...., yR.
Proof. Since F is continuous, µj−1(x|~y,GJ) is continuous in ~y for any x. Then for any
sequence {~yn} → ~y, µj−1(x|~yn, GJ) → µj−1(x|~y,GJ) and in particular this is true at
each point of continuity of µj−1(.|~y,GJ). Thus, µj−1(x|~yn, GJ) converges weakly to
µj−1(x|~y,GJ) by [1, Theorem 25.8, p. 335]. Then, by the definition of weak conver-
gence
∫ +∞
−∞ x dµj−1(x|~yn, GJ) →
∫ +∞
−∞ x dµj−1(x|~y,GJ) that proves the continuity of
ΛGJj .
It is straightforward from the definition of z that a decrease in yj−1 or an increase
in yj shifts µj−1(x|~y,GJ) in the sense of first order stochastic dominance downwards.
An increase in yl, l ≥ j decreases the ratio z(x˜; ~y,GJ)/z(x; ~y,GJ), as one can verify
through differentiation, and hence it also shifts downwards the distribution function
µj−1(.|x; ~y,GJ) in the sense of first order stochastic dominance downwards. ¥
We can now apply an induction argument to conditions (i)-(iii).
Lemma 7. For R 6= 1, there exists a unique function ψGJR : [rR−1, 1] → [rR, 1] that
satisfies:
(ii) ΛGJR (yR−1, ψ
GJ
R (yR−1)) = 0 if ψ
GJ
R (yR−1) < 1.
(iii) ΛGJR (yR−1, ψ
GJ
R (yR−1)) ≤ 0 if ψGJR (yR−1) = 1.
This function is continuous, weakly increasing and ψGJR (yR−1) ≥ yR−1.
Proof. Trivially, ΛGJR (yR−1,max{rR, yR−1}) < 0. Then, distinguish two cases for any
yR−1 ∈ [rR−1, 1], either: (*) ΛGJR (yR−1, 1) > 0, or (**) ΛGJR (yR−1, 1) ≤ 0. In case
(*) condition (iii) is not satisfied, and Lemma 6 implies that there is a unique value
for yR that solves condition (ii). In case (**) there is no value that solves condition
(ii), but condition (iii) is satisfied. Hence, we have a unique function ψGJR such that
yR = ψ
GJ
R (yR−1) solves conditions (ii)-(iii) for any given value of yR−1. Finally, Lemma
6 implies that ψGJR is a continuous and weakly increasing function. ¥
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Suppose that there exist some functions {ψGJl : [rl−1, 1]→ [rl, 1]}Rl=j+1 continuous
and weakly increasing, and ψGJl (yl−1) ≥ yl−1 for all l ∈ {j + 1, ..., R}. Let ωGJl :
[rj , 1] → [rl, 1] where ωGJl (yj) ≡ ψGJl ◦ ψGJl−1 ◦ ... ◦ ψGJj+1(yj) for l = j + 1, j + 2, ..., R
which are obviously continuous and weakly increasing functions.
Lemma 8. For j 6= 1, there exists a unique function ψGJj : [rj−1, 1] → [rj , 1] that
satisfies:
(ii) ΛGJj−1(yj−1, yj , ω
GJ
j+1(yj), ..., ω
GJ
R (yj)) = 0 if yj < 1.
(iii) ΛGJj−1(yj−1, yj , ω
GJ
j+1(yj), ..., ω
GJ
R (yj)) ≤ 0 if yj = 1.
This function is continuous, weakly increasing and ψGJj (yj−1) ≥ yj−1.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 7. ¥
Hence, by induction there exists a unique solution for conditions (i)-(iii) and this
is such that y1 = r1 and yj = ψ
GJ
j ◦ ψGJj−1 ◦ ... ◦ ψGJ2 (r1) for j ∈ {2, 3, ..., R}.
Proof of Lemma 2
One property of the unique equilibrium of the entry game is that bidders pay the
same expected price in every auction they enter with positive probability. This is a
consequence of the indifference condition that must hold in a mixed strategy equi-
librium. Thus, a bidder’s expected payment conditional on winning an auction with
reserve price rj when her type is x (obviously for x ≥ yj) equals Ψ(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ) in
equilibrium.
Then, the expected payoffs of an auctioneer that fixes a reserve price rj equals the
probability of selling times the expected value conditional on selling of the following
difference: the expected price that the winner of the auction pays conditional on
winning minus the auctioneer’s production cost w.
To complete the proof of the lemma note that the probability of selling equals
the probability that at least one bidder enters, this is 1 − z(y∗j (GJ); ~y∗(GJ), GJ)kJ .
Conditional on the former event, the probability that the bidder that wins has a type
below x, for x ∈ [y∗j (GJ), 1], equals z(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)kJ/(1− z(y∗j (GJ); ~y∗(GJ), GJ)kJ).
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Proof of Lemma 3
For cut-offs associated to reserve prices less or equal than rj(G) the claim is straightfor-
ward. For the other cut-offs, we can apply a similar proof to that of step 2 in Lemma
1.
Proof of Lemma 4
We divide the proof in three steps. First, we rewrite our equilibrium conditions (i)-(iii)
so that along any sequence of entry games the set of equations and unknowns remains
the same. In the second step, we compute the limit of these new conditions and we
show that the limit of the solutions converge to the solution of the limit conditions.
Finally, we use the former result to compute the convergence of the auctioneers’ payoff
function.
Step 1: Rewriting the equilibrium conditions.
From now on, we shall describe a cut-off strategy with an extended vector of cut-
offs, ~y ∈ [0, 1]R. This differs from the original vector of cut-offs in that we associate
a cut-off value to each each reserve price in Π, and not only to reserve prices in the
support of GJ/J . Note that applying the definition of a cut-off strategy, changes in
cut-off values associated to reserve prices that are not announced by any auctioneer
do not change the entry strategy of the bidder.
We next adapt conditions (i)-(iii) and the corresponding functions to the extended
vector of cut-offs. The new conditions, that we refer as the extended conditions (i)-(iii),
are such that the solution cut-offs associated to reserve prices in the support of GJ/J
are also solution to the original conditions (i)-(iii). Now, we refer to the minimum
reserve price in the support of GJ/J as rj(GJ ) and to its associated cut-off as yj(GJ ).
We start noting that the original definition of the function z can be directly applied
to the extended vector of cut-offs for x ≥ yj(GJ ). Clearly, z keeps the same meaning
as before. Something similar happens with ΛGJj (and µj−1(.|~y,GJ)), for j > j(GJ).
We also define ΛGJj (yj−1, yj , ..., yR) ≡ yj − rj for j ≤ j(GJ). This means that cut-offs
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equal reserve prices for those reserve prices weakly below the minimum reserve price
announced by the auctioneers.
We redefine the extended conditions (i)-(iii) according to the original conditions
(i)-(iii) but for the extended vector of equilibrium cut-offs and with the new definition
of ΛGJj . Clearly, the new conditions also verify Lemma 6. Thus, we can adapt Step 2
in the proof of Lemma 1 to prove that there exists a unique extended vector of cut-offs
that satisfies our conditions.
We next show that the cut-offs that solve the extended conditions (i)-(iii) are also
solution to the original conditions (i)-(iii). The proof is direct for the cut-off associated
to the minimum reserve price in the support of GJ/J . Consider next the extended
condition (ii) associated to other reserve prices rj that belong to the support of GJ/J .
If rj−1 also belongs to the support of GJ/J then the extended condition (ii) is exactly
the same as the original condition (ii). Suppose now that rj−1 does not belong to
the support of GJ . The extended condition (ii) for rj can be written as the following
equation: ∫ yj
yj−1
x˜
dz(x˜; ~y,GJ)kJ−1
z(yj ; ~y,GJ)kJ−1
+ rj−1
z(yj−1; ~y,GJ)kJ−1
z(yj ; ~y,GJ)kJ−1
= rj .
The extended condition (ii) also implies that a similar equation must hold for rj−1.
We can combine both equations substituting rj−1 to get:∫ yj
yj−2
x˜
dz(x˜; ~y,GJ)kJ−1
z(yj ; ~y,GJ)kJ−1
+ rj−2
z(yj−2; ~y,GJ)kJ−1
z(yj ; ~y,GJ)kJ−1
= rj .
If rj−2 belongs to the support of GJ/J , the above condition is basically the original
condition (ii) for rj . Otherwise, we can continue substituting recursively until we get
a reserve price in the support of GJ/J .
A similar procedure also works for extended conditions (iii). Hence, any solution
of the extended conditions (i)-(iii) must also be a solution of conditions (i)-(iii).
Step 2: Convergence of the equilibrium cut-offs.
We assume along Step 2 that there exists an infinite sequence {GJ}J , where GJ ∈
GJ , such that GJ converges weakly (and thus point-wise) to G ∈ G when J tends to
infinity. We start by showing the convergence of the functions ΛGJj .
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Lemma 9. For any j ≤ j(G),
ΛGJj (yj−1, yj , ..., yR)
J→∞−−−→ Λ¯Gj (yj−1, yj , ..., yR)
point-wise, and where Λ¯Gj (yj−1, yj , ..., yR) ≡ yj − rj.
Proof. We split the sequence {GJ}J into two: a subsequence that includes distribution
functions such that j ≤ j(GJ), and a subsequence that includes the other distribution
functions. For the first subsequence the claim follows by definition of ΛGJj , see its
definition in Step 1. For the second subsequence, note first that G(rj−1)/J tends to
zero for j ≤ j(G) as GJ/J converges weakly (and thus point-wise) to G. Then, for
x ∈ [yj−1, yj),
0 ≤
(
z(x; ~y,GJ)
z(yj ; ~y,GJ)
)kJ−1
=
(
1− 1
z(yj ; ~y)
F (yj)− F (x)
G(rj−1)
)kJ−1
≤
(
1− F (yj)− F (x)
G(rj−1)
)kJ−1
=
1− F (yj)−F (x)G(rj−1)/J
J
kJ−1 J→∞−−−→ 0,
where we have used that following mathematical result: for any sequence aJ
J→∞−−−→
+∞, and such that aJ ∈ (0, J) then (1− aJ/J)J J→∞−−−→ 0.
This means that µj−1(.|~y,GJ) converges everywhere to a probability measure with
a single mass point at yj . This implies convergence in all the continuity points and
thus, weak convergence of the probability measures by [1, Theorem 25.8, p. 335].
Then, the lemma follows by definition of weak convergence. ¥
Lemma 10. For any j > j(G),
ΛGJj (yj−1, yj , ..., yR)
J→∞−−−→ Λ¯Gj (yj−1, yj , ..., yR)
point-wise, and where Λ¯Gj (yj−1, yj , ..., yR) ≡
∫ +∞
−∞ x dµ¯j−1(x|~y,G)− rj , with
µ¯j−1(x|~y,G) ≡

0 if x ∈ (−∞, rj−1)
z¯(yj−1;~y,G)
z¯(x;~y,G) if x˜ ∈ [rj−1, yj−1)
z(x;~y,G)
z¯(yj ;~y,G)
if x ∈ [yj−1, yj)
1 if x ∈ [yj ,∞).
(3)
19
Proof. Since GJ/J converges weakly to G (and thus point-wise) yj(GJ ) ≤ yj(G) but
for finitely many elements in the sequence {GJ}J . Thus, we can disregard them to
compute the limit. Then for x ∈ [yj−1, yj ], with yj−1 ≥ yj(G), and so yj−1 ≥ yj(GJ ),
z(x; ~y,GJ)kJ−1 =
1− F (yj)−F (x)GJ (rj−1)/J +∑Rq=j F (yq+1)−F (yq)GJ (rq)/J
J
kJ−1
J→∞−−−→ e−k
[
F (yj)−F (x)
G(rj−1) +
∑R
q=j
F (yq+1)−F (yq)
G(rq)
]
= z¯(x; ~y,G), (4)
where we have used to compute this limit the following mathematical result: for any
sequence aJ
J→∞−−−→ a, it is verified that (1 + aJ/J)J J→∞−−−→ ea.
As a consequence, µj−1(.|~y,GJ) J→∞−−−→ µ¯j−1(.|~y,G) everywhere. Again, this com-
pletes the proof. ¥
Clearly, conditions (i’)-(iii’) can be stated as follows:
• (i’) y1 = r1.
• (ii’) Λ¯GJj (yj−1, yj , ..., yR) = 0 if yj < 1 (j 6= 1).
• (iii’) Λ¯Gj (yj−1, yj , ..., yR) ≤ 0 if yj = 1 (j 6= 1).
We can use the arguments in the proof of Lemma 1 to show that conditions (i’)-
(iii’) define implicitly some functions ψGj . These are such that the j-th entry of the
R dimensional solution of the conditions (i’)-(iii’) equals ψGj ◦ ψGj−1 ◦ ...ψG2 (r1) for all
j ∈ {2, 3, ..., R}. Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 shows that the equations in conditions (i)-
(iii) converge point-wise to the equations in conditions (i’)-(iii’). Restrict for simplicity
to the case in which all the equilibrium cut-offs are interior, i.e. strictly less than one.
Then we can apply recursively Lemma 13 (see at the end of Step 3) to show that ψGJj
converges uniformly to ψGj for any j = 2, 3, ..., R. This implies the following lemma.
Lemma 11. The extended vector of equilibrium cut-offs ~y∗(GJ) converges to the limit
vector of equilibrium cut-offs ~y∗(G) when J tends to infinity.
Step 3: Convergence of the auctioneers’ payoff function.
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Lemma 12. Take an infinite sequence of distributions of reserve prices {GJ}J (GJ ∈
GJ) such that GJ/J converges weakly to G ∈ G when J tends to infinity. Then:13
(a) If x ∈ [sup {y∗j(GJ )}J , 1) and x 6= y∗j (G) (j ∈ {1, 2, ..., R}), then:
z(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)kJ
J→∞−−−→
 0 if x < yj(G)z¯(x; ~y∗(G), G) if x > yj(G).
Ψ(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)
J→∞−−−→ Ψ¯(x; ~y∗(G), G) for x > yj(G).
(b) If j ≥ max {j(GJ)}J , then:
z(y∗j (GJ); ~y
∗(GJ), GJ)kJ
J→∞−−−→
 0 if j < j(G)z¯(y∗j (G); ~y∗(G), G) if j ≥ j(G).
(c) If x ∈ [sup{y∗j(GJ )}J , yj(G)), then:
kJ z(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)kJ−1
J→∞−−−→ 0.
Proof. It can be deduced from conditions (i’) and (ii’) that y∗j (G) < y
∗
j+1(G) (where
recall that y∗R+1(G) ≡ 1) for all y∗j (G) < 1. Let j be such that x ∈ (y∗j (G), y∗j+1(G)).
Lemma 11 implies that for J sufficiently large x ∈ (y∗l (GJ), y∗l+1(GJ)). Next, we can
use an adaptation of the proofs of Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 in Step 2 together with
Lemma 11 to prove point (a). Point (b) can also be proved using an adaptation of
the proof of Lemma 10 in Step 2 together with Lemma 11. In order to prove (c)
note that for x < yj(G) the function z(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ) can be written as 1− aJ/J with
aJ
J→∞−−−→∞ because GJ(rj)/J → 0 for rj < rj(G). Hence,
0 ≤ lim
J→∞
kJ(1− z(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ))z(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)kJ−1 =
lim
J→∞
kJ
aJ
J
(
1− aJ
J
)kJ−1 ≤ lim
J→∞
kaJ e
−(kJ−1)aJ
J = lim
J→∞
kaJ
eaJ(k−
1
J )
= 0,
where we have used (1− a) ≤ e−a in the third step. ¥
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We can now conclude the proof of the convergence of the auctioneers’ payoffs. Note
that if G˜J−1/(J−1) converges weakly to G, then GJ (the distribution of reserve prices
that describes rj and G˜J−1 together) also converges weakly to G. We start with the
case rj ≥ rj(G). Lemma 11, Lemma 12(a), and the Lebesgue bounded convergence
theorem [9, Theorem 16, p. 91] in the third step below imply that:
lim
J→∞
Φ(rj , w, G˜J−1) = lim
J→∞
{∫ 1
y∗j (GJ )
(Ψ(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)− w) dz(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)kJ
}
=
lim
J→∞

R∑
l=j
∫ y∗l+1(GJ )
y∗l (GJ )
(Ψ(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)− w) z(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)kJ−1k f(x)
GJ(rl)/J
dx
 =
R∑
l=j
∫ y∗l+1(G)
y∗l (G)
(
Ψ¯(x; ~y∗(G), G)− w) z¯(x; ~y∗(G), G)k f(x)
G(rl)
dx =
∫ 1
y∗j (G)
(
Ψ¯(x; ~y∗(G), G)− w) dz¯(x; ~y∗(G), G) = Φ¯(rj , w,G).
Consider now the case rj < rj(G), then we split the integral that defines Φ(rj , w, G˜J−1)
into the following two halves:∫ y∗
j(G)
(GJ )
y∗j (GJ )
(Ψ(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)− w) dz(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)+∫ 1
y∗
j(GJ )
(GJ )
(
Ψ(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)− w
)
dz(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ),
where yj(G)(GJ) is the equilibrium cut-off associated to the minimum reserve price in
the support of G, when the distribution of reserve prices is GJ .
Note that we can compute the limit of the second part of the above integral fol-
lowing exactly the same steps as in the case rj ≥ rj(G). For the second part note the
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following algebraic transformations:14∫ y∗l
y∗j
(Ψ(x)− w) dz(x)kJ =
∫ y∗l
y∗j
(∫ x
y∗j
x˜d
z(x˜)kJ−1
z(x)kJ−1
+ rj
z(y∗j )
kJ−1
z(x)kJ−1
− w
)
dz(x)kJ =
∫ y∗l
y∗j
[
x− w − (y∗j − rj)
z(y∗j )
kJ−1
z(x)kJ−1
−
∫ x
y∗j
z(x˜)kJ−1
z(x)kJ−1
dx˜
]
dz(x)kJ =
∫ y∗l
y∗j
(x− w) dz(x)kJ −
∫ y∗l
y∗j
kJ
[
(y∗j − rj)z(y∗j )kJ−1 +
∫ x
y∗j
z(x˜)kJ−1 dx˜
]
dz(x) =
(y∗l − w)z(y∗l )kJ − (y∗j − w)z(y∗j )kJ −
∫ y∗l
y∗j
z(x)kJ dx
− (y∗j − rj) kJ z(y∗j )kJ−1
[
z(y∗l )− z(y∗j )
]
− kJ
∫ y∗l
y∗j
∫ y∗l
x
dz(x˜) z(x)kJ−1dx =
(y∗l − w)z(y∗l )kJ − (y∗j − w)z(y∗j )kJ −
∫ y∗l
y∗j
z(x)kJ dx
− (y∗j − rj) kJ z(y∗j )kJ−1
[
z(y∗l )− z(y∗j )
]
−
∫ y∗l
y∗j
kJ z(x)kJ−1 [z(y∗l )− z(x)] dx.
Hence, we can apply Lemma 12 to prove using the Lebesgue bounded convergence
theorem [9, Theorem 16, p. 91]:
lim
J→∞
∫ y∗
j(G)
(GJ )
y∗j (GJ )
(
Ψ(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)− w
)
dz(x; ~y∗(GJ), GJ)kJ =(
rj(G) − w
)
z¯(rj(G); ~y
∗(GJ), G).
This last result completes the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 13
Lemma 13. Let {Yn}∞n=1 be a sequence of continuous functions with compact domain
in R2 that converges point-wise to a function Y . Suppose that each of the functions
Yn and Y are strictly increasing in the first argument and weakly decreasing in the
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second argument, and are such that for any x in the domain, there exists a y˜n such that
Yn(y˜n, x) = 0 and a y˜ such that Y (y˜, x) = 0. Then the sequence of functions yn defined
by Yn(yn(x), x) = 0 converges uniformly to the function y defined by Y (y(x), x) = 0.
Proof. We start taking an ² > 0. Note next that the monotonic properties and continu-
ity of Y imply that y must be continuous. Hence, for each x in the domain of y, there
exists a δ(x) > 0 such that if x′ ∈ (x−δ(x), x+δ(x)), then y(x′) ∈ (y(x)− ²4 , y(x) + ²4).
We denote by J(x) the set of such x′, i.e. J(x) ≡ (x− δ(x), x+ δ(x)). Since by defini-
tion Y (y(x′), x′) = 0, and y(x)− ²2 < y(x)− ²4 < y(x′) and y(x)+ ²2 > y(x)− ²4 > y(x′),
the monotonic properties of Y imply that for all x′ ∈ J(x), Y (y(x) − ²2 , x′) < 0, and
Y (y(x) + ²2 , x
′) > 0.
Point-wise convergence of Yn to Y implies that there exists a n0(x) ∈ N such that
if n ≥ n0(x), then Yn(y(x) − ²2 , x′) < 0, and Yn(y(x) + ²2 , x′) > 0, for all x′ ∈ J(x).
Hence, the continuity of Yn implies that for all x′ ∈ J(x) and n ≥ n0(x),
yn(x′) ∈
(
y(x)− ²
2
, y(x) +
²
2
)
⊂ (y(x′)− ², y(x′) + ²) .
Note that x ∈ J(x), thus the domain of y, say D, is a subset of ∪x∈DJ(x). Since D
is compact, the Heine-Borel theorem [9, Theorem 15, p. 44] implies that there exists a
finite collection of sets in {J(x)}x∈D that covers D, i.e. D ⊂ ∪Mm=1J(xm), forM finite.
Take n0 = max{n0(x1), n0(x2), ..., n0(xM )}, then for all n ≥ n0,
yn(x′) ∈ (y(x′)− ², y(x′) + ²),
for all x′ ∈ D, this is, for all x′ in the domain of y. This proves uniform convergence
of yn to y. ¥
End of the Proof of Proposition 1
In a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies all the auctioneers use the same map
from the set of production costs to the set of reserve prices. Since both sets are finite,
the set of auctioneers’ pure strategies, say Θ, is finite.
Denote by G˜J−1(.|θ, w) the distribution of reserve prices that an auctioneer with
production cost w faces when all the other auctioneers use the pure strategy θ in a
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game with J auctioneers. Clearly, the sequence G˜J−1(.|θ, w)/(J − 1) converges weakly
to a distribution function with support in Π when J tends to infinity. We denote by
G(.|θ) this limit distribution.
Let ∆(w, rj , θ) ≡
∣∣Φ¯(w,w,G(.|θ))− Φ¯(rj , w,G(.|θ))∣∣, and
δ ≡ min{∆(w, rj , θ) : ∆(w, rj , θ) > 0, (w, rj , θ) ∈ ΠW ×Π×Θ}.
Since the set is finite, then δ > 0. Lemma 4 implies that there exists a J¯ such that if J ≥
J¯ , then |Φ¯(rj , w,G(.|θ))−Φ(rj , w, G˜J−1(.|θ, w))| < δ/2 for all (w, rj , θ) ∈ ΠW ×Π×Θ.
Putting together this result and Lemma 5 we can prove the following:
Lemma 14. For any (w, rj , θ) ∈ ΠW ×Π×Θ there exists a J¯ such that if J ≥ J¯ , then
for rj 6= w,
Φ(w,w, G˜J−1(.|θ, w)) > Φ(rj , w, G˜J−1(.|θ, w))
in the following cases:
(A) rj(G(.|θ) < w < rj¯(G(.|θ)).
(B) w ≤ rj(G(.|θ)) and rj ≥ rj(G(.|θ)).
(C) w ≥ rj¯(G(.|θ)) and rj < rj¯(G(.|θ)).
The strategy in which all the auctioneers announce reserve price equal to production
cost is θ(w) = w for any w ∈ ΠW , and clearly, it implies that G(.|θ) = H. Now, recall
that by assumption (see the last paragraph in Section 2): r1 = rj(H), and w < rj¯(H)
for any w ∈ ΠW . Thus, Lemma 14 (A) and (B) imply that for J > J¯ auctioneers
do not have incentives to individually deviate from θ(w) = w, and thus, that it is an
equilibrium strategy.
To prove uniqueness we assume that all the auctioneers use the strategy θ ∈ Θ.
Then we show that if θ is an equilibrium strategy, then θ(w) = w for any w ∈ ΠW .
Suppose θ(r1) 6= r1. Clearly, r1 ≤ rj(Gθ) and θ(r1) ≥ rj(G(.|θ)), thus, Lemma 14 (B)
implies that auctioneers with production cost r1 have a profitable deviation which is
a contradiction. Similarly, suppose that θ(w) = r1 for w 6= r1. Clearly, r1 < rj¯(G(.|θ)),
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so Lemma 14 (A) and (C) implies that Φ(w,w, G˜J−1(.|θ, w)) > Φ(r1, w, G˜J−1(.|θ, w)).
This means that auctioneers with production cost w 6= 1 have a profitable deviation
which is a contradiction.
We now proceed by induction. Suppose that there exists a rj ≤ max{ΠW } such
that θ(w) = w for w < rj , and such that θ(w) ≥ rj for w ≥ rj , this is H(x) = G(x)
for all x < rj . Clearly, rj > rj(G(.|θ)), and moreover, the arguments below show that
rj < rj¯(G(.|θ)). Thus, Lemma 14 (A) imply that if rj ∈ ΠW then either θ(rj) = rj or
there is a profitable deviation. Moreover, Lemma 14 (A) and (C) imply that if w > rj ,
then θ(w) > rj , otherwise there is a profitable deviation.
It only remains to be shown that if rj < max{ΠW } and H(x) = G(x) for all x < rj ,
then rj < rj¯(G). Under our assumption that w < rj¯(H) for any w ∈ ΠW , it is sufficient
to show that y∗j (G) = y
∗
j (H) if H(x) = G(x) for x < rj .
If rj ≤ rj(G) the claim is direct from condition (i’). Suppose now that rj > rj(G).
Then condition (ii’), and something similarly could be done for condition (iii’), can be
rewritten as follows:∫ yj
yj−1
x k
f(x)
G(rj−1)
e
−k F (yj)−F (x)
G(rj−1) dx+ rj−1e
−k F (yj)−F (yj−1)
G(rj−1) = rj .
If rj = rj(G)+1, then y∗j depends onG only up to the value ofG(rj(G)). Consequently
the claim follows for this reserve price. Note that in general for rj > rj(G) we can apply
recursively the last argument to show that y∗j depends on G only up to the value of
G(rj(G)), G(rj(G)+1), ..., G(rj−1). This completes the proof of our claim.
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Footnotes
1. We keep the proportion of bidders to auctioneers fix, hence the number of bidders
grows at the same rate as the number of auctioneers.
2. McAfee [3] does not exactly assume that the numbers of auctioneers and bidders
are infinite. Instead, McAfee assumes that an auctioneer does not take into
account that when he changes his mechanism, the expected utility that bidders
can get in other auction mechanisms changes. McAfee justifies this assumption
conjecturing that it should be true in the limit when the number of auctioneers
and bidders tends to infinity.
3. The assumption that the support of F equals [0, 1] implies that we do not consider
situations in which the production cost of an auctioneer is below the minimum
valuation of the bidders. The same arguments provided by Peters [4] also imply
here that this assumption is crucial for our results.
4. We believe that our results could be easily extended to the case in which bidders
can participate in more than one auction under the following additional assump-
tions. Each bidder has a constant marginal utility for a finite number of units
and zero for additional units. The number of units from which the bidder obtains
strictly positive utility is a finite number greater than the maximum number of
auctions that the bidder can enter. Under these assumptions it is still true that
it is weakly dominant for the bidder to bid her true value of the good. If these
assumptions are not met then there is no straightforward solution for the bidding
game, and hence, we cannot extend easily our analysis.
5. We show in the working paper version that the optimality of the policy reserve
price equal to production cost also holds when first price auctions are allowed.
The reason is that it can be shown that first price and second price auctions with
the same reserve price are revenue equivalent.
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6. See the discussion in the Conclusions about the role of the discretisation.
7. Note that the formula that we give has on the right hand side one minus the
probability of the complementary event to the one described in the text.
8. Since the elements of the sequence {GJ/J}J has support included in the finite set
Π weak convergence, point-wise convergence and Euclidean convergence coincide.
9. The probability that no bidder enters an auction with reserve price rj in equilib-
rium equals z(y∗j (GJ); ~y
∗(GJ), GJ)kJ . Lemma 12(b) implies that if y∗j (GJ) tends
to one, this probability tends to one.
10. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this point and most of the comments
that follow.
11. Note that when we allow for general heterogeneity among auctioneers we would
require uniform convergence in two dimensions: strategies and types, i.e. in
reserve prices and production costs.
12. The continuity of the auctioneer’s payoff function is proved in the working paper
version of the this paper, whereas the discontinuity has already been shown by
Peters [4] and Peters and Severinov [8].
13. We restrict x in (a) and (c) to be greater than the supremum of {y∗j(GJ )}J and j
in (b) to be greater than the maximum of {j(GJ)}J as the function z is defined
only for x greater or equal than the cut-off associated to the minimum reserve
price announced by at least one auctioneer.
14. To simplify the notation we write Ψ(x), y∗l , and z(x) for Ψ(x; ~y
∗(GJ), GJ),
y∗l (GJ), and z(x; ~y
∗(GJ), GJ), respectively.
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